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After the Big Deals Are Done 
 
Here is comfort for those on the verge of leaving Big Deals, solace for those who already have.  
Whether you arrived at this juncture by principle or lack of principal, the message is the same: the 
survival of the academy is not at stake.  
Southern Illinois University Carbondale’s Morris Library left three Big Deals over the course of 
2009 and 2010.  Yet faculty continue to conduct research, publish, and teach their students, who 
continue to write their theses and dissertations and get their degrees.  Grants continue to be secured.  
People continue to come into the Library to use our resources.  All evidence indicates that subscriptions 
to entire publisher portfolios are not essential to the functioning of a modern research university.  Not 
that this serves as some kind of epiphany for higher education; SIUC, like every other higher education 
institution, functioned quite well for over a hundred years before the advent of the Big Deal – thrived, 
and even grew.   
SIUC is a modern research university, in the Doctoral University: Higher Research Activity 
category, according to the 2016 Carnegie Classification.  We are not the in the top tier, we are in the 
second tier.  This puts us in the same category with 106 other U.S. higher education institutions, 
including Auburn, Dartmouth, Oklahoma State, the University of Rhode Island, and the like.   
Our participation in Big Deals foundered on the faulty premise underlying the model, which is 
predicated on the maintenance of a Library’s expenditure at the point of time in which it signs on to the 
agreement (its “historical spend”), plus an annual percentage increase.  The faulty premise is that our 
budget would continue, at least on average, to increase enough to meet the Big Deals’ increases.  This 
did not happen, as it did not and still does not happen for many institutions – probably for the majority 
of the 106 Highers like us.   
In practice, because the Deals’ annual increases exceeded the increases in the Library’s budget, 
they were consuming an ever larger share of our budget.  In 2004, we spent 24% of our budget on these 
Deals; by 2008, the figure had risen to 33%.  This, in turn, meant less money for the universe of 
resources available for us to choose from – even while that universe is always expanding.  There are two 
costs associated with this: the cutting of the Library’s existing resources to compensate, and the 
opportunity cost of not adding new resources because the budget is squeezed and there is no additional 
funding available.  Assessments of the value of Big Deals (discussed further below) that do not include 
these costs fail to present the whole story. 
They also ignore the big picture – the impact of Big Deals on the scholarly publishing 
marketplace as a whole.  The costs mentioned above also reverberate in the marketplace, since 
institutions locked into Big Deals are spending less elsewhere.  Where do libraries go to find offsets for 
the increasing costs of the Big Deals?  To those publishers and vendors who do not operate on that 
model, particularly academic and professional societies, university presses, and independent publishers.  
This has the effect of forcing these publishers, who are not driven by the search for profit and who 
charge lower subscription prices than do commercial publishers, to consider other arrangements for 
their publishing, all too often resulting in their consumption by the commercial publishers.  There are 
diverse reasons for smaller publishers to pursue such a move, but one important consideration is the 
guaranteed subscription base (and hence income) provided by libraries’ participation in Big Deals.  We 
are indisputably contributing to market consolidation, which results in ever higher prices for all of us.   
Leaving the Big Deals levels the playing field for all publishers and vendors in our collection 
development decisions.  We decide, of course channeling the preferences of the University community, 
what we will buy or subscribe to, based on all those traditional and developing factors and metrics that 
Librarians have at their disposal.  This allows us to develop a true freedom collection.        
Locally, then, an important outcome of leaving Big Deals is the increased flexibility and control 
over the collection gained, since less of the budget is tied up in arrangements that lock in an ever-
increasing obligation.  Unfortunately, in these times of scarcity, the flexibility we have achieved is 
measured out not in what new products we can add, but which existing resources we will 
cut.  Nevertheless, the problem would be exacerbated if we had maintained our Deals - the estimate is 
that we save annually between $300,000 and $400,000 (depending on what annual increase percentage 
is used) since our departure; that is the amount we would we paying each and every year to the three 
publishers above what we are paying now, if we had not left the Deals.  The figure would of course 
increase every year.  To compensate for this difference, we would be forced to cut other resources, not 
because they are less valuable, but because they are not protected by similar agreements.  To put it in 
perspective, this is about the amount we spend on books each year. 
Greater flexibility is also achieved in the ability to adjust our current subscriptions from the Big 
Deal publishers, since we are not contractually bound to maintain our current spend.  Optimal pricing is 
achieved on an annual basis if we do maintain our subscriptions, but we have been able to reduce our 
expenditures with the publishers when needed.  The important point is that we can do so much more 
easily now. 
Negotiations have not been adversely affected by our departures.  Publishers still, and always 
will, want as much of our (and your) budget as they can get, and will negotiate to achieve that.  This is 
why, contrary to what may seem obvious, we have for the most part been able to negotiate lower 
increases than what we had when we were in the Big Deals.     
The advantages to not participating in Big Deals are clear.  How to explain their resiliency?  Most 
institutions are not so flush with funding that the costs of Big Deals, as described above, are avoided.   
The value must be assumed to be worth those costs. 
The appeal of Big Deals appears obvious: access to journals not otherwise available.  The value 
also appears obvious, as most frequently shown by download numbers.  We too were susceptible to the 
appeal, and impressed by the apparent value, of our Deals.  When we looked more closely, which we 
were forced to do because the faulty premise of the model became more and more exposed, the lush 
landscape of plenty looked more like a mirage, and the numbers were printed on a house of cards.       
Assessment of resources relies heavily on the number of downloads and a Cost Per Use 
calculation.  (These may or may not be the only assessment components, but is anyone not using them?)  
These metrics, particularly the latter, can then be compared to those of other resources.  The higher the 
download numbers, and the lower the Cost Per Use figure, the stronger the case for the Big Deal, or any 
resource. 
Little attention is given to any interpretation of the numbers.  Downloads are taken at face value 
as an objective criterion of assessment.  A download is a “good thing,” an accurate indicator of demand.  
Further, downloads are downloads, and it is assumed that there is no difference between a download 
from one publisher, vendor, or resource compared to another.  Partly this is due to the success of the 
Counter standards that have been developed, which do achieve at least some consistency in the 
reporting of resource use.  Partly it is due to the difficulty of tracing how downloaded content is actually 
used.     
There is a real need for the profession to examine these assumptions more closely.  Much is 
riding on them, but serious examination of them has only occurred around the edges.  Our experience 
suggests that there are significant flaws in these assumptions, and that while download numbers are 
essential in assessment, they do not contain any meaning in and of themselves.  A detailed description 
of the evidence provided by our experience at SIUC is outside the scope here, but is summarized below 
(more information can be found in Nabe, Jonathan and Fowler, David. "Leaving the “Big Deal” … Five 
Years Later." The Serials Librarian 69, No. 1 (Jul 2015): 20-28. doi:10.1080/0361526X.2015.1048037).  
For the sake of brevity, the case of only one publisher is discussed here, but the observations and trends 
are applicable for the others as well.   
Downloads of non-subscribed content alone from this publisher amounted to 11,254 from 597 
titles in the year before we ceased our Big Deal.  These are phenomenal numbers that would seem to go 
a long way to justifying the Deal.  Closer examination revealed some concerns, however.  To begin with, 
62% of the non-subscribed titles had averaged less than 12 downloads per year, and a full 10% had 
received no downloads.  By any measure, these were not essential titles for the University.          
Even more clarification was provided by analysis conducted post-departure.  We did this analysis 
because we wanted to measure the impact of our decisions; it was possible, after all, that they had been 
the wrong ones.  The results indicated otherwise. 
Downloads and the CPU calculations derived from them can only work for paid content.  How do 
you assess the value of lost content, or measure the impact of a decision to end access to it?  Requests 
via Interlibrary loan for lost titles can serve as a proxy for actual demand, and that is the method we 
have used.  Objections can be made that ILLs do not fully represent all demand, either, since researchers 
can use professional and personal networks, individual subscriptions, open access repositories or web 
sites, etc., to get the content.  Download numbers over report demand, ILL requests under report it.  
The real demand lies somewhere in between, no one really knows where.  But in addition to serving as a 
corrective to the download numbers in the attempt to measure demand and calculate value, analysis of 
ILL requests in this context also fulfills a practical need: it tells us the impact on library operations, staff 
time and outlays, of leaving Big Deals.   
Again, for brevity’s sake details are provided for the single publisher used above.  Briefly, the 
annual number of ILL requests averages 2% of the pre-departure downloads of the non-subscribed titles, 
over the five year period post-departure.  47% percent of the lost titles which had some downloads pre-
departure have not had any ILL requests.  The average number of ILL requests per title is less than 2.  
There has been no flood of requests for ILLs, putting pressure on the staff, or spike in our costs, putting 
pressure on our budget.  While the ratio of requests to downloads has increased over the years - to be 
expected as additional issues of the journals are published - it has never reached a level that cannot be 
absorbed by the library as part of its everyday workflow.  If any given title is shown by ILL requests to 
warrant an individual subscription, swapping for a lesser used title is always possible - but has not been 
indicated to date. 
What this analysis shows is that for us, Big Deals were unaffordable overkill.  Nice to have, for 
public relation’s sake and for convenience sake too.  But they were not providing essential content; on 
the contrary, they were forcing us to cut essential resources, and would have done so an accelerating 
rate had we maintained them.  Leaving them has not led us to the brink of oblivion, it has just taken us 
back to the place we all came from: a Library with the subscriptions that the University needs and that 
we can afford. 
 
    
 
 
 
             
 
 
 
 
 
